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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Disposition of Insurance Policy of Bankrupt Assignee-Bankrupt's husband insured his own life, making his brother
the beneficiary. The brother later assigned all his interest to the husband,
who later assigned to the bankrupt. The trustee claimed that the policy
passed to him as an asset of the estate. Held, that the bankrupt may pay
the cash surrender value to the trustee and keep the policy under § 7oa (5)
of the Bankruptcy Act.' In re Jacobson, 24 F. Supp. 749 (D. N. J. 1938).
In arriving at this result, the court followed the line of reasoning
approved in the discussion of In re BeaChley,2 which appeared in a previous issue of the REVIEW.' In the latter case, where the bankrupt was
not related to the insured or to the beneficiary, the opposite result was
reached. Thus the decision in the instant case brings out more strongly
the personal interest that should be required when the bankrupt is permitted to keep the policy. Although § 7oa (5) is not expressly so limited,
the intention of Congress, which is to procure for the trustee the sum available at the time of bankruptcy and otherwise to leave to the bankrupt the
benefit of his insurance, 4 can only be accomplished when the bankrupt has
more than an economic interest in the policy.5
Conflict of Laws--Burden of Proof as "Substance" or "Procedure"
under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins-An accident in New York gave rise to
a negligence case which was brought in a federal district court in New
York. During the trial the question arose as to which party had the
burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence. Held, that the
burden was on the plaintiff because this is the New York rule which must
be followed under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins I that the federal
courts shall follow the substantive law of the state. Schopp v. Muller
Dairies,Inc., 6 U. S. L. WEEK 218 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
This case illustrates one of the difficulties which are likely to confront the federal courts in applying the Erie rule.2 Before that doctrine
can be applied, where a federal rule conflicts with that of a state, the preliminary question of whether these rules are substantive or procedural
must be decided. The federal rule applicable to this case, as stated in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is that the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant.3 The New York rule, on the other
I. 30 STAT. 565 (I898), II U. S. C. A. § IIOa (5) (I937). The Chandler Act
changes this provision only in that it limits those who may take advantage of it to
natural persons. 52 STAT. 879, II U. S. C. A. § ilOa (5) (Supp. 1938).
2. ig F. Supp. 104 (D. Md. 1937).
3. (1937) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 97.
4. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473 (1913).
5. The same result was reached in Curtis v. Humphrey, 78 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A.
5th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 605 (935), where the bankrupt was also the wife of
the insured and beneficiary of the policy.
I. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). "There is no federal general common law." Id. at 78.
2. See Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), holding that federal Equity Rule 27 governed the case rather than the New York law which allowed
a stockholder's suit for transactions prior to acquisition of stock.
3. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8c (1938). Washington & Georgetown
R. R. v. Gladman, 15 Wall. 4O (U. S. 1873); Indianapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Horst,
93 U. S. 291 (1876).
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hand, is that the plaintiff must prove freedom from fault.4 Whether this
issue is a matter of substance or procedure is a question of great difficulty
and the authorities are hopelessly divided.5 The Supreme Court of the
United States has decided that it is a matter of substance." The Court
of Appeals of New York has ruled that it is a matter of procedure.7 Now
the question arises as to which of these latter authorities the district court
should follow in determining whether the burden of proof issue is substantive or procedural." This is also a question on which the authorities
are divided. Professor Beale stoutly maintains that no law other than the
law of the forum could possibly control the court in determining how many
of the rules of the lex loci should govern the action at the forum.5 On the
other hand, the Restatement states that if the lex loci interprets its requirement concerning proof of freedom from fault "as a condition of the
cause of action itself, . . . the court at the forum will apply the rule of the
foreign state".' 0 It is the contention of this comment that the answer to
this question is found in the Erie doctrine." If the decision of the Court of
Appeals that its rule is procedural is itself a substantive decision, the district court must follow that New York decision. It would seem that this
decision is substantive because a decision on an issue of whether a given
law does or does not "relate to rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action" 12 must itself relate to those rights and duties. Accordingly the
4. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry.,

252

N. Y.

127,

169 N. E. 112, 68 A. L. R. 8oi

(930).

5. Precourt v. Driscoll, 85 N. H. 280, 157 Atl. 525 (1931), 78 A. L. R. 883 (1932) ;
Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333.
Compare GooDRicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (ist ed. 1927) 167, "But there would seem good
reason for holding that putting the burden of showing the facts on one party or another
is merely a question of procedure; it concerns 'how' and not 'what' is to be proved!"
with Cook, supra at 346, advocating that it be called substantive "for often the location
of the burden in these cases is really decisive as to which side Will emerge victorious".
6. Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915). See also cases cited in
MooRE AND FRIEDMAN, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § 43.02, n. 25. But see id.
§ 8.io to the effect that the present Supreme Court must regard the matter as proce-

dural, since it was included in the new rules of procedure, supra note 3.
7. Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 1O9 N. E. 1O9 (1915). See also New
York cases cited in Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 883.

8. The district court in this case followed the Supreme Court. "In view of the
inescapable that the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is not merely a matter
of procedure, but is a matter of substance."
9.BEALE, CONFLiCT OF LAWS (1935) § 5842.
10. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 595, comment a. Cf. id. § 584:
"The court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict of Laws rule whether
a given question is one of substance or procedure." Professor Goodrich follows both
these sections of the Restatement. GooDicHr, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 200,
19o. See Note (1926) 11 MINN. L. REv. 45, pointing out that courts usually decide
decisions in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and Central Vt. Ry. v. White, the conclusion is

this question without giving any reason.
ui.See Brandeis, J., in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.64, 78 (1938) : "Congress

has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether
they be local in their nature or 'general', be they commercial law or part of the law of
torts." Hence, if the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on this issue
is substantive law, it cannot control the district court in opposition to the New York
decisions.
12. Jones v. Erie R. R., io6 Ohio St. 408, 412, 14o N. E. 366, 368 (1922), defining
"substantive" law. Professor Lorenzen's definition in The Statute of Frauds and the
Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311, 325, "all rules determining the legal relations which courts will declare when all the facts have been made known to them"
brings us to the same conclusion. A rule which decides whether another rule determines "the legal relations" leaves those legal relations either subject to the latter rule
or unaffected by it. Until this decision is made the "legal relations" are uncertain,

hence the decision "determines" them.
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district court should have followed the New York substantive precedent,
arrived at the conclusion that the matter was procedural, ignored the New
York procedural rule, and applied rule 8c of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 13

Conflict of Laws-Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction
Over the Subject Matter-Husband, after being granted a divorce
a mensa et thoro in District of Columbia, sought an absolute divorce in
Virginia on the ground of desertion.1 Wife appeared in the Virginia
proceeding and attacked the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter,
alleging husband was not a bona fide resident of Virginia. There was
"argument of counsel" and a commissioner was appointed to report on the
question. The commissioner's finding sustaining jurisdiction was adopted
by the Virginia court, and absolute divorce without alimony was granted
to husband. Husband thereupon applied to the District of Columbia court
to cancel its alimony order on the basis of the Virginia divorce decree. 2
Wife cldimed that that decree was a nullity because husband had not established a bona fide domicil in Virginia and therefore that court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' Held, that the Virginia court's determination that it had jurisdiction and the decree based thereon were
binding upon wife and entitled to full faith and credit.4 Davis v. Davis,

6 U. S. L. WEEK 269 (U. S. 1938).
After failing to appear and object to the confirmation of a 77 B reorganization plan under which the solvent guarantor of bankrupt's bond was
discharged, bondholder started an action in the Illinois court against the
guarantor and then petitioned the district court to modify the reorganization plan on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to cancel the guaranty.
The petition was denied by the district court and no appeal was taken.
13. See Tobin v. Pennsylvania R. R., 6 U. S. L. WEEK 218 (App. D. C. 1938),
which, in a dictum, concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controlled the
federal courts on the issue of contributory negligence.
i. Desertion was not recognized by the District of Columbia at that time as a
ground for absolute divorce.
2. A prior application for the same relief on the basis of the Virginia decree had
been denied by the District of Columbia without passing upon the Virginia court's
jurisdiction. Davis v. Davis, 57 F. (2d) 414 (App. D. C. 1932).
3. The lower court granted husband's second application on the ground that it
could modify its former alimony decree in view of the fact that a daughter had married
in the interim; it denied validity, however, to the Virginia decree. Davis v. Davis, 96
F. (2d) 512 (App. D. C. 1938).
4. On the question of the jurisdiction of the state of domicil of one spouse to grant
divorce, the Davis case is given an added importance by the Supreme Court's analysis
in distinguishing Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (i9o6), limiting the rule of that
case on much the same basis as that adopted by REsTATENT, CoNm.Icr oF LAws
(934) § 113 (a) ii. Some of the sting of the many criticisms directed at this section
may, as a result, be removed. See Beale, ConstitutionalProtection of Decrees of Divorce (I9o6) ig HARv. L. REV. 586; Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HAV. L.
REv. 417; Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court (1936) 31
CoRN. L. Q. 393; Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce (1935) 2 LAw & CoNTomp.
PROB. 334; McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 564.
For other articles on the conflict of laws divorce problems see Fox, The Recognition of Foreign Decrees of Divorce (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 139; Jacobs, Attack on
Decrees of Divorce (1936) 34 Mica. L. REv. 749; Peaslee, Ex Parte Divorce (1915)
28 HA v. L. REv. 457; Richards, The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce (192o) 15 ILh. L. Rzv. 259; Walton, International and Migratory Divorces (1927) 21 ILL L. REv. 435.
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The guarantor in the Illinois proceeding set up the defense that the order
of the bankruptcy court was res judicata. Held, that regardless of whether
under the Bankruptcy Act the district court had jurisdiction to cancel a
guaranty, its order is res judicata and binding on the bondholder in the
state action, since the matter had been contested in the district court. Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 6 U. S. L. WEEK 344 (U. S. 1938).
The dogma that want of jurisdiction renders a judgment void, and
hence that a jurisdictional defect can be collaterally attacked in another
proceeding, was seriously qualified by the Supreme Court in Baldwin v.
Traveling Men's Association." There the Court held that a corporation
which had appeared specially to contest the validity of service on its
alleged agent could not thereafter question the court's decision on this point
in a proceeding in another state to enforce the prior judgment. It was
reasoned that since the contesting party had had his day in court the ruling
should be considered res judicata. After the Baldwin decision, authorities
differed as to how far the principle of that case should be extended. It
was thought, for example, that the rule there applied to jurisdiction over
the person would not cover those cases where jurisdiction over the subject
matter was in question.6 It is certainly less shocking to limit the remedy
of one who uses the fiction of a special appearance to argue that the court
has no jurisdiction over his person, than to allow a court to "lift itself
into jurisdiction" 7 over a subject matter foreign to its powers, although it
was ably argued that the same considerations of principle and policy apply
in each case." On the other hand, it was thought that the Baldwin decision should be limited to those cases involving the determination of a
jurisdictional fact, where the court of rendition would be in a superior
position to have all the evidence before it.9 The instant decisions present
a conclusive answer to both these questions. Both cases involved a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the district court ruling
held binding in the Gottlieb case was based on statutory construction where
no question of fact was in issue.10 It is difficult to think of a type of juris-

dictional controversy which would not fall within the rule of one of these
three cases, 1 and together they seem to stand for the proposition that
5. 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
6. See Goomicir, CoNFLicT oF LAWs (2d ed. 1938) 33. The RESTATEMENT treated
the matter in a caveat to § 451: "The Institute expresses no opinion whether and how
far a party appearing and participating in the proceedings in a court of any state is
precluded from subsequently questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action in the courts of that state or any other state if the court in which
he appeared purported to render a judgment against him."
7. GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 34.
8. ARNOLD AND JAMES, CASES ON TRIALs, JUDGMENTS, AND APPEALS (1936) 133;
Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of JurisdictionalFacts (1935) 2 U. OF
CHL L. REV. 552; Gavit, Jurisdictionof the Subject Matter and Res Adjudicata (i93 )
8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 386; Medina, Conclusveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931)
31 COL. L. REV. 238.
9.It was on this basis that the Supreme Court of Illinois held it was not bound
by the district court decision in the Gottlieb case. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 368 Ill. 88 (1938).
io. It is possible that the rule of the Gottlieb case will work a practical hardship
upon small bondholders in 77B reorganization proceedings since the cost of an appeal in
such a case is often so very high as to be prohibitive. See, however, Note (1937) 85 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 827, in which collateral attack upon the findings of a 77B court is decried inasmuch as reorganization proceedings usually entail such a great expenditure of
time and money.
ii. Still left open is the question of what acts by the contesting party in the court
of rendition are necessary to make a judgment without jurisdiction res judicata. In
all three cases the fact of appearance and argument on the jurisdictional objection was
stressed by the Court. Unanswered are the questions of whether a plea objecting to
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once a question of jurisdiction is raised and argued in the court of rendition the
decision on that point is just as binding as a ruling on the
2
merits..

Constitutional Law-Fifteenth Amendment-Validity of State
Statute Indirectly Disfranchising Negroes-An Oklahoma statute '
made it mandatory for registrars to register all those who voted in 1914,
others to be registered only if the registrars "shall be satisfied" that they
are qualified. In 1914 no Negroes voted, due to a constitutional provision
that was subsequently invalidated. Held, that this was not in violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment, for there was nothing on the face of the
statute discriminating between white and Negro electors. Lane v. Wilson,

98 F. (2d) 98o (C. C. A. ioth, 1938).
In the light of recent indignation over persecution of racial minorities
abroad, it is interesting to note that disfranchisement of the Negro in our
own southern states remains an established fact. 2 Since the adoption of
the Fifteenth Amendment8 there has been an uninterrupted series of
attempts to evade it, and the process of trial and error has disclosed the
loopholes through which this evasion might be successfully achieved.4
Essentially, the problem was that of establishing qualifications that would
exclude the Negro without at the same time excluding the white.' It was
early thought that exemptions from registration requirements held the
solution, and several states established, by statute 1 or constitutional amendment,7 the "grandfather clauses", so-called because they exempted from
the strict operation of the registration provisions persons qualified to vote
jurisdiction withdrawn before argument, or appearance and argument on the merits by
the contesting party failing to raise the jurisdictional issue would have a similar conclusive effect. On the latter point it is significant that the Court in the Gottlieb case
distinguished Vallely v. Northern Fire Insurance Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920), which held
that a judgment after argument on the merits where lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised would not be res judicata.
12. Cf. lower federal and state court cases which have indicated this solution:
Chinn v. Foster-Milburn Co., 195 Fed. 158, 161 (W. D. N. Y. 1912); Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers, 2o0 Minn. 599, 275 N. W. 300 (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 676 (1938).
I. I OKLA. STAT. (1931) §§ 5654, 5657.
2. LmviNsoN, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY (1932)

c. 6; SAlT, AMERiCAN PARTIES

AND ELECTIONS (1927) C. 2; Johnson, A Negro Looks at Politics (1929) 18 ATS. MERcuRY 88; Weeks, The White Primary (1935) 8 Miss. L. J. 135.
3. U. S. CONsT. Amend. XV, § I (forbidding denial or abridgement of the right to
vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"). See United States
v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217 (1875). See also MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909) ; Rose, Negro Suffrage: The Consti-

tutional Poinzt of View (19o6) I Am. POL. ScI. REv. 17.
4. These measures were at first extra-legal, then in the nature of constitutional
provisions, and, most recently, by way of legislative and party regulation of primaries.
See LEwiNSOoN, op. cit. supra note 2, cc. 5, 6 and app. 3 (summary of southern election
laws in 193o); PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918) 196;
Johnson, loc. cit. supra note 2; Note (193o) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 309. Particularly
illustrative of the persistency of the southern states in their efforts to exclude the
Negro is the experience of Texas, for which see (1935) 2 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 64o. On
the regulation of elections in general see 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

(8th

ed. 1927) i36o et seq.
5. LEwiNso, op. cit. supra note 2, at 83 et seq.; Eaton, The Suffrage Clause in
the New Constitution of Louisiana (1899) 13 HARv. L. REv. 279.
6. Md. Laws 1908, c. 525, P. 347, Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 (1915).
7. LA. CONST. (1898) art. 197, § 5; N. C. CONST. art. VI, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art.
III, § 4a.
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at some time fixed prior to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment,
exempting their descendants as well." The invalidation of these clauses
in 1915 9 induced a change of tactics, so that at the present time the commonest method of disfranchising the Negro is the "white primary". 10 But
Oklahoma, its "grandfather clause" voided by the Supreme Court in Guinn
v. United States," merely modified its registration laws in an effort to
meet the constitutional objections, and within seven months of that decision
passed the statute here involved. The instant court, in failing to invalidate
this statute, has not only sanctioned a plain violation of the Constitution,
but in so doing, has refused to follow the authority of the Supreme Court
-neglecting to even consider the Guinn case in its opinion, although it was
cited by plaintiff. The cases are analogous, for neither in the "grandfather
clause" nor in this statute was there any express discrimination. But
while the Supreme Court, wary lest mere forms of expression render inoperative the Fifteenth Amendment, invalidated the "grandfather clause" on
the ground that it was "in substance but a revitalization of conditions"
destroyed by the Amendment,32 the instant court refused to look behind
mere form to the purpose and ultimate operation of the statute. Indeed,
the establishment of participation in the election of 1914 as the standard
is but an indirect continuation of the very restrictions which were declared
invalid by the 1915 decision. 3
Constitutional Law-Immunity of Federal Employee to State
Taxation-Relator paid under protest a state income tax on his salary
earned partly as attorney for the Home Owners Loan Corporation. Held,
that his application for a refund should be granted, because the salary of
a federal employee is immune to state taxation. People ex rel. O'Keefe
v. Graves, 16 N. E. (2d) 404 (N. Y. (1938), cert. granted, 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 465 (U. S. 1938).'
8. Some writers distinguish from these the "old soldier clauses" which provided
similar exemptions on the basis of service in the army or navy. ALA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ ISo; VA. CONST. (1902) art. II, § ig; see Notes (915) I CORN. L. Q. 32, 33, (I91I)
24 HARv. L. Ray. 388, 389. Generally, however, no such distinction is made, and both
are referred to as "grandfather clauses". See Caffey, Suffrage Limitations in the
South (I9o5) 20 POL. ScI. Q. 53, 62; Johnson, supra note 2, at go. Compare Storey,
The "Grandfather Clause" (1§13) 6 LAw. & BANK. 358, with Brewer, The Grandfather
Clause (914) 7 LAw. & BANK. 263.
9. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915) (invalidating Oklahoma constitutional provision) ; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 (1915) (decided the same day,
invalidating a Maryland statute). Contra: Atwater v. Hassett, 27 Okla. 292, 111 Pac.
802 (igio) ; Cofield v. Farrell, 38 Okla. 6o8, 134 Pac. 407 (1913).
lo. So-called because participation in the primary is restricted to whites; and because of the one-party nature of these states the victor in the primary of that party is
virtually certain of election, so that the inability to vote in the primary renders inefficacious the vote in the general election, thus amounting to disfranchisement. See Fraenkel, Restrictions on Voting in the United States (1938) I NAT. LAW GuILD Q. 135,
14o; Weeks, loc. cit. supra note 2; Notes (1935) 97 A. L. R. 685, (193o) 8 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 309, 310, (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1212.
II. 238 U. S. 347 (1915).

12. Id. at 364. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, II8 U. S. 356, 373 (1886). Compare
24 HARV. L. Rv. 388.
13. See Monnet, The Latest Phase of Negro Disfranchisement (1912) 26 HARv. L.

Note (1914) 14 COL. L. Ray. 336, 337, with Note (191o)

REV. 42, 53; Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 349; Editorial (ii6)

I So. L.

Q.

46, 48

I. Other recent cases involving the same problem: Clinton v. State Tax Commission, 146 Kan. 407, 71 P. (2d) 857 (1937) (salary of stenographer of federal land
bank not immune) ; Gordy v. Prince, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 17, 1938, p. I,
col. I (Ct. of Apps. Md. 1938) (assistant regional manager of the H. 0. L. C.) ; Martin v. Kenesson, 119 S. W. (2d) 644 (Ky. 1938) (secretary and treasurer of a Produc-
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The instant decision is in line with existing authority, the Supreme
Court of the United States having upheld the immunity of the salary of
an employee of a federal-owned corporation as recently as 1936.2 The
recent attack on the immunity doctrine in general 3 has led to the belief
that it will be limited in all fields, and the decisions of the Supreme Court
in the last term indicating a disposition in this direction have given added
weight to this belief.4 However, there was added to the subject a doubtful element in the declaration of the Court that a distinction should be
made between the immunity of federal and state agencies, and that the
former should be accorded greater consideration under the doctrine. This

distinction was announced in Helvering v. Gerhardt,5 where a federal tax
on the salary of an employee of the Port of New York Authority was
upheld, and thus prevents that decision from being controlling in favor
of the tax in the instant case. 6 In making this distinction, Justice Stone
went back to the language of M'Culloch v. Maryland7 where the immunity of the operations of federal agencies was established on the grounds
of the supremacy of the federal government within the field laid out for
it by the Constitution 8 and what appeared to Chief Justice Marshall to
be the patent viciousness of a tax by a part of the people upon the legitimate activities of the whole.9 This long-ignored possibility of a distinction 10 would seem at best a make-weight argument in favor of limiting
state immunity rather than a valid reason for not narrowing the wide
field of federal immunity created by former decisions of the Court. It
should be noted that the more substantial reasons given by the Court for
upholding the federal tax in the Gerhardt case would apply with equal
force in the instant case. The Court felt that the tax as applied to Gerhardt's salary came within both the traditional exceptions to the doctrine
of immunity: that the activity of the employee of the Port of Authority
was proprietary rather than governmental,"- and that the levy imposed
tion Credit Corporation) ; Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 68o,
174 So. 567 (I937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 742 (1937) (salary of vice president of federal land bank not immune to state taxation) ; Van Cott v. State Tax Commission of
Utah, 79 P. (2d) 6 (Utah 1938) (salary of counsel for Agriculture Credit Corporation

immune).

2. New York v. Graves,
court's opinion see (1936) U.

299 U. S. 401 (1936).
OF PA. L. REv. 664.

For a discussion of the lower

3. That the doctrine should come to be criticized was inevitable from the facts of
the increased expense of government necessitating more extensive tax levies, and the
extension of government activities giving wider scope to the immunity. For especially
violent attacks on the doctrine see, Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 22 GEo. L. J. I, 254, and Lowndes, Taxing the Income from Taxexempt Securities (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 643.
4. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 3o3 U. S. 376 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L.
Ra. 306, 665; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938). See Lowndes, Taxation
and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. R;-. i. See also from the
previous term of the Court, James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (937),
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rr-v. 308.
5. 304 U. S. 405 (1938).

6. Boudin, sipra note 3, at 254 et seq.
7. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig).
8. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4o6 (U. S. i8ig). For an extended discussion of the doctrine of supremacy and its history in this field, see Boudin, supra
note 3.
9. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428 (U. S. 1819). Justice Stone uses
this observation of Marshall as a practical argument for a distinction. He contends
that there will be less likelihood of the taxing power's getting out of hand where the
representatives of all the people are taxing a part than in the converse situation, and
that therefore less immunity should be given the state.
IO. See Boudin, supra note 3.
ii. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 424 (1938).
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only an indirect burden on the state. 12 If the Port of Authority's building
of bridges and improving of highways were proprietary rather than governmental, it is difficult to see why the HOLC's lending activities should
not be similarly classified.' 3 And if the tax in the Gerhardt case amounted
to only an indirect burden on the state, there seems to be no reason
why the substantially similar tax of the instant case should not also impose only an indirect burden on the federal government.' 4 Further, the
fear which Justice Stone expresses of a diminishing source of federal
income through the extension of state activities should be felt to no less
a degree when it is a question of the reduction of state revenues through
the recent extension of the activities of the federal government.' 5 The
main difficulty with justice Stone's distinction is that it leaves the way
open for the continuation of the unwarranted extensions of the doctrine of
federal immunity which, like the extensions of state immunity, are as
false as their basic principle that the "power to tax is the power to destroy." 16
Criminal Procedure-Verdict-Right of Trial Judge to Set Aside
Verdict of Jury and Dismiss Indictments-Defendants were indicted
for violations of the anti-trust laws. At the close of the trial defendants
moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge reserved decision on the
motions' and sent the case to the jury who found defendants guilty. The
judge then set aside the verdict of the jury as being against the weight of
the evidence and dismissed the indictments. United States v. Standard Oil
Company (Indiana), 23 F. Supp. 937 (W. D. Wis. 1938).
The unique procedure followed in the instant case seems to be without precedent in the annals of the common law.2 So far as can be found
12. Id. at 42o. Cf. Wrightington v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. No. 159 (1938),
where a town counsel's services were declared tax-exempt.
13. The argument has been made that the "Federal Government being a sovereign
which can act only within specified powers granted to it by the Constitution can necessarily engage only in governmental enterprises". Lowndes, The Supreme Court on
Taxation, 1936 Term (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. I. This argument has not as yet
been considered by the courts. But in the light of recent government participation in
matters traditionally thought to be of a private nature, and the liberal attitude of the
courts in upholding legislation to this end, the argument would appear to be more
theoretical than real.
14. Indeed, the instant case would seem to be a fortiori on this point, since O'Keefe
was an attorney and not an employee in a formal sense. Cf. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
289 U. S. 514 (1925).
15. The Court itself has not been insensitive to the danger to the taxing power of
the state should the immunity of federal agencies be carried too far. Railroad v. Peniston, i8 Wall. 5, 33 (U. S. 1873) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 154
(1937), (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 308.
I6. See (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 3o8.

I. The trial had lasted four months during which time the jury had been sequestered and the court felt that it would have been unjust and unfair to the jury to have
kept them in custody while the motions received full and adequate consideration. There
now seems to be some doubt as to whether the court reserved decision on the motions
for a directed verdict or whether the instant ruling followed a subsequent motion for
a new trial. See Brief of the Government, filed Dec. 17, 1938, on application for man-

damus in C. C. A. 7th.
2. In State v. Bossio, 136 Wash. 232, 234, 239 P. 553, 555 (1925), mention was
made of much the same procedure, though as the case arises the court did not pass on
the point. See also infra note ii. Cf. HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(3d ed. 1923) which seems to support the doctrine. However, Mr. Holdsworth has
retracted his statement. See Brief of the Government, supra note I, at io3.
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none of the commentators on the criminal law have mentioned any such
case nor do they even speak of the possibility of a trial judge granting
in a criminal case a ruling analogous to a judgment n. o. v. in the civil
law. By inference at least it would seem that the common law recognized
no such right. In early English law it was conceived that if a jury returned a verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence and found a defendant guilty, the most the court could do was to "reprieve the person convict
before judgment, and to acquaint the king, and certify for his pardon." 3
Indeed the only control the court had over the jury at the early common
law was to fine them for delivering a bad verdict and it was not until the
seventeenth century that a new trial could be granted on the ground that
the verdict of guilty was against the weight of the evidence. 4 Prior to this
the court had no power to set the verdict aside and the finding of the jury
as to the guilt of the accused was conclusive of that fact. In the United
States, in order to obviate any difficulty of running astray of the common
law, it has been found necessary to pass statutes governing the right of
the accused to a new trial and this proceeding is recognized as being purely
statutory." Hence, in this country it would seem that in the absence of
statutory provision the verdict of the jury once given would be conclusive. However, it is well settled that the court may direct verdicts of
acquittal if it is satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a
conviction.7 It might reasonably be argued from this that if the court
could direct a verdict of the jury there is nothing in principle to prevent
it from overruling the verdict after the jury has deliberated. The substantial interests of the state would be limited no more in one case than
in the other. The same judge is deciding both questions on precisely the
same facts and evidence. The fact that the prosecution could not appeal
the decision,8 as the losing party may in the analogous civil judgment
n. o. v., 9 is of no greater disadvantage to the state than its inability to
appeal in the case of a directed verdict."0 Thus although there is no direct
3. 2 HAL, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (778) 309. Though Hale cites no authority,
inferential support for the proposition can be found in The King v. Joseph Bazeley, 2
Leach 853 (1799), where defendant was indicted for feloniously taking a bank note and
found guilty. The case was reserved for the opinion of the "Twelve Judges" who found
as a matter of law that there was no felony here, "and the defendant was included in

the Secretary of State's letter as a proper object for a pardon". See also The King
and Smith, (1729) T. Jones Reports 163.
4. I CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW (1836) pp. 653-660; HAWKIN'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN

(rst ed.

1721)

c. 47,

(1898) 175-179.

§ ii;

THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON

THE

LAW OF EVIDENCE

5. See Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220, 227 (1876) and authorities cited therein. See
also People v. Marble, 38 Mich. 309 (1878).
6. McCutcheon v. State, 176 Ind. 13, 93 N. E. 545 (19ri); Campbell v. Downer,

Dist. Judge, 94 Kan. 674, 146 Pac.
W. 153 (1904).

1o39

(1915) ; Hubbard v. State,

72

Neb. 62, oo N.

7. Mickle v. United States, i57 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) ; cases collected in
(1922) i7 A. L. R. 9io; RESTATEMENT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) § 321. As
to power of court to direct a verdict of guilty see Note (931) 72 A. L. R. 899.
8. Only in Connecticut is a new trial allowed on the state's appeal. See State v.
Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 3o Atl. II1o (1894).
9. In a civil case under new rule of procedure 5o b., the Federal trial judge may
consider a motion for a directed verdict and refuse it. Thereafter, if the jury returns
a verdict against the party who made the motion, he may renew his prior motion which
the judge is deemed to have taken into consideration pending the jury's verdict. 3
MOORE AND FRIEDMAN, MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTrICE (938)
§ 50.02.
Io. In the instant case the government has filed a petition praying that the order
be rescinded and expunged from the records and the defendants sentenced or granted
new trials, on the ground that the order is null and void for want of power or jurisdiction of the court to make it. See Dept. of Justice, Public Statement, Aug. 28, 1938.

Note
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precedent for the procedure adopted by the instant court,1 ' the result obtained is not contrary to the substantial principles of the common law and
may well be sustained on a practical basis.
Defamatiori-Qualified Privilege-Character of Belief Necessary
-Defendant's agent had accused the plaintiffs, employees of the defendant
company, of having stolen some butter. Defendant pleaded a qualified
privilege on the ground that the words were uttered to advance the defendant's interests.' The case was submitted to the jury and the verdict
was rendered for the plaintiffs. Defendant obtained a judgment n. o. v.,
the court ruling that, the occasion being privileged, it was incumbent upon
the plaintiffs to rebut the qualified privilege by showing express malice or
excessive publication. On appeal it was held that the judgment should
be reversed because the occasion is but one element of a qualified privilege; in addition it must appear that the actor had probable cause to believe the truth of the statement. The burden of proving presence of probable cause is on the defendant, since he is the one attempting to avail
himself of the defense of privilege. Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., i A. (2d) 495 (Pa. Super. 1938).
The problem of the character of belief that defendant must have in
the truth of the defamatory remarks in order that he may avail himself
of the defense of qualified privilege has caused a split of authority. Under
the majority view, an honest belief is sufficient.2 The minority, with
which Pennsylvania aligned itself by the decision in Briggs P. Garrett s
adds another requirement, holding that the defendant must also have probable cause to believe the statements to be true. 4 Thus, under the minority,
honest but negligent actors are placed beyond the immunity given by the
qualified privilege.5 This extension of negligence into the field of defamation has been sanctioned by authorities who feel that a greater uniformity
It will be interesting to see if the court will allow this appeal by way of mandamus
proceedings or construe it to be placing the defendants in double jeopardy and thus refuse to hear the petition.
ii. In Commonwealth v. Coyne, 115 Pa. Super. 23, 175 Atl. 291 (1934) the appellate court felt that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, but
instead of granting a motion for a new trial the court ordered the defendant released.
Thus it would seem that the appellate court would have the power to order the release
of a defendant without granting a new trial.
i. Defendant was qualifiedly privileged since the circumstances were such as to
induce him to believe that the remarks would advance defendant's interests. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938)

§ 594; HARPER, TORTS (1935) § 249.

2. In Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248 (1926), 15 GEO. L. J.
192 (1927), the court held the following charge error: "provided, however, they are
made upon reasonable grounds, in good faith and honestly made, even though in fact
the words were false or unfounded". The court said the belief need not be reasonable,
it is sufficient if it is honest. See Hallen, Characterof Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation (193i) 25 ILL. L. REv. 865, 868.
3. III Pa. 404, 2 AtI. 513 (1886).
4. Instant case at 499. See also Hodgkins v. Gallagher, 122 Me. 112, 119 Atl. 68
(1922) ; Hartman v. Hyman & Lieberman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 Atl. 486 (1926), 25 MICE.
L. REV. 310 (1927).

5. It is interesting to note that the jurisdictions following the minority view did
not do so by a consideration of the extension of the doctrine of negligence. Pennsylvania arrived at this view by drawing an analogy between the cases of defamation and
cases of malicious prosecution. In Briggs v. Garrett, 114 Pa. 404, 414, 2 Atl. 513, 521
(I886), the court said: "An action for libel (or slander) is upon all fours with an
action for a malicious prosecution." New Hampshire drew an analogy between civil
and criminal libel. Carpenter v. Bailey, 53 N. H. 590, 594 (1873). See Hallen, supra
note 2, at 873.
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of tort law is thus to be had. 6 The Restatement has adopted this minority
view.7 Pennsylvania courts, however, have gone further than the other
jurisdictions in holding that the burden of proof of probable cause is on
the defendant. The theory of the other jurisdictions requiring probable
cause, is that the qualified privilege is a prima facie defense, which is rebuttable by proof of absence of due care.' A difference in the definition
of the term qualified privilege is the cause of the split. According to the
Pennsylvania courts, the occasion is but one element of a qualified privilege, and probable cause, absence of malice, and absence of excessive publication are other elements; therefore, since defendant wishes to avail himself of the defense, he must plead and prove all the elements." The other
jurisdictions reason that the occasion alone determines the existence of
the privilege and that probable cause, absence of malice, and absence of
excessive publication deal not with the existence but with abuse of the
privilege.' 0 The latter line of reasoning seems more desirable since it is in
conformity with other types of privileges in the field of tort law.
Receivers-Power of Court of Equity to Order Sale of Insolvent's
Property Free of Liens, and Without Right of Redemption-Plaintiff,
a holder of first and second mortgage bonds secured by deeds of trust on
all of the insolvent railroad's property, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a receiver's sale of the property. Under the order of the court which
provided that the mortgage liens were to be transferred to the proceeds
of the sale, the property was to be sold free of liens and without right
of redemption as was requested in the receiver's petition for the sale which
was joined in by the trustees under the deeds of trust. The sole ground
urged for the writ was that the court lacked the jurisdiction to order such
a sale where the bondholders were not parties to the proceedings. Held,
(one justice dissenting) that the writ should be denied, because the published notice of the petition made the bondholders parties to the proceedings, and therefore the court had the requisite jurisdiction. Chapman v.
Schiller, 83 P. (2d) 249 (Utah, 1938).
Generally where the lienors are parties to the proceedings a court of
equity may direct a receiver to sell an insolvent's property free of liens,
transferring the liens to the proceeds.' Such a substitution of security is
6. Smith, Are Charges Against the Moral Characterof a Candidate for an Elective
Office Conditionally Privileged? (igi) 18 MICE. L. REV. I, 12. Hallen, supra note 2,

at 874, accepts the minority view as the better of the two, but realizes that hardships
will result under either view. He suggests, therefore, that the test be modified to read,
"defendant must act as a reasonable man under the circumstances". Id. at 876.
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 6o1. In the explanatory notes to § io44, RE-

STATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1936), the reporter cites the test proposed

by Hallen, discussed supra note 6.
8. Sweeney v. Higgins, 117 Me. 415, 104 Atl. 79, (1918) ; Hallen, supra note 2,
at 87o; Harper, Privileged Defamation (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 642, 646.
9. Instant case 499 and cases cited therein.
io. Harper, supra note 8; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 613.
I. Miner's Bank of Wilkes-Barre v. Acker, 66 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933);
Davis v. Patterson, i8o Ark. 918, 25 S. W. (2d) 452 (1930) ; State ex rel. Avenius v.
Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 Pac. 499 (1927). Cf. Maxwell Lumber Co. v. Connelly, 34
N. Mex. 562, 287 Pac. 64 (1930). Contra: Hough v. Lucas, 76 Colo. 94, 23o Pac. 789
(1924).
But cf. Bloxham v. Consumers' Electric Light & St R. Co., 36 Fla. 519, 18
So. 444 (1895) ; Edwards v. Pratt, 171 Okla. 257, 42 P. (2d) 5o6 (1935). Compare
these last two cases with Spreckels v. Spreckels Sugar Corp., 79 F. (2d) 332 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935). See cases collected in Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 458. See also I CLARK,
RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 500 (b) ; 16 FLETCHIER, CYcLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1933) § 7878.
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not so material a modification as to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. 2 Nor is it an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, since these constitutional provisions are said to forbid
only legislative enactments.3 Furthermore, the conteition that the fundamental principles of law impose similar restrictions on the judiciary 4 is
negatived by the almost universal enforcement of such sales by the courts
whose duty it would be to declare such a limitation." In the instant case,
however, the application of the rule might be questioned on the grounds
that the bondholders were not parties to the proceedings. It has been held
that actual service of legal process on the interested parties is necessary
to give the requisite jurisdiction, 6 but since the purpose of the rule is merely
to enable those who might be injured by such action to protest it where
improperly or unnecessarily taken, 7 a more liberal interpretation seems
desirable. In the instant case, for example, no prejudice resulted from
the lack of actual notice since the plaintiff knew of the order in time to
take legal action to protest its consummation. The purpose of the rule
being thus satisfied," and individual notice being impractical owing to the
number of bondholders, the published notice should be deemed sufficient 9
especially since the trustees participated in the proceedings, assuring the
bondholders of representation.10 On the question of the right to redeem,
the court was likewise justified in its action 11 since no statute expressly
granted the right after a receiver's sale.12 Public policy requires that
insolvent railroads and other utilities be sold in such manner as will enable
the purchaser to continue the service for which they were created, and
granting the right would defeat this by subjecting the continued service
to subsequent interruption by a junior lienor 1
2. See FiNLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPOtATE REORGANiZATION TN BANKRUPTCY
(937) 619 n. 2.
3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § io; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 18.

4. See dissent in instant case at 259. Accord: Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Northumberland County Traction Co., 258 Pa. 152, 1o Atl. 97o (1917). Compare Trust Co.
case with Baird v. Moshannon Coal Min. Co., 318 Pa. 63, 178 Atl. 19 (1935).
5. See It re Haisie, 206 Fed. 789, 792 (D. C. Tex. 1913). See also FLETCHER, loc.
cit. supra note i; Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 458.
6. Edinburg Irr. Co. v. Paschen, 235 S. W. io88 (Tex. Com. App. 1922).
7. Walter M. Ballard Co. v. Peyser, 90 F. (2d) 414 (App. D. C. 1937).

8I

U. OF PA.

L. REV. 348, 349.

Cf. (1933)

8. In Walter M. Ballard Co. v. Peyser, go F. (2d) 414 (App. D. C. 1937), the
court held that the failure of the receivers to give interested parties actual notice of
the petition for authority for a sale free of liens was not prejudicial where they received
actual notice three days before the sale and moved to enjoin the sale.
9. Cf. Walter M. Ballard Co. v. Peyser, 90 F. (2d) 414 (App. D. C. 1937) ; Bailey
& Collins v. Ryan Cotton Oil Mill Co., iig Okla. 57, 248 Pac. 321 (1926). Accord:
Pilliod v. Angola R. & Power Co., 46 Ind. App. 719, 91 N. E. 829 (i9io).
io. Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 293 Ill. App. I, 12 N. E. (2d) 32 (937);
In both these cases,
State ex rel. Avenius v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 Pac. 499 (927).
service on a trustee under a deed of trust was held sufficient.
ii. Hammock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 1O5 U. S. 77 (1882); American
Mine Equipment Co. v. Illinois Coal Corp., 31 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; Mercantile Realty Co. v. Stetson, 120 Iowa 324, 94 N. W. 859 (903).
See American Mine Equip12. UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) § 104-37- (29,30,40).
ment Co. v. Illinois Coal Corp., 31 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929). See also 2
WILTSE MORTGAGE FoREcLosuRES (4 th ed. 1927) § lO49, indicating that statutes of this
nature only give the right after a foreclosure sale, and are to be strictly interpreted.
13. See Hammock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, at 89 (1882)
for a good discussion of the public policy underlying the denial of a right of redemption
after a receiver's sale of the property of an insolvent railroad. See also Note (1913)
A. ANN. CAS. 624.
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Taxation-Multi-State Taxation of Income Received from Discretionary Trust-The state of Virginia assessed an income tax against
a resident beneficiary of a discretionary trust on income received under
the trust. The trust was administered in New York and an income tax
assessed by that state was paid by the trustees. The beneficiary sought a
refund of the Virginia tax on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional
assessment. Held, that the refund should be denied since the levy contravened neither the equal protection clause I nor the due process clause.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 83 L. Ed. 33 (1938).
In affirming the state court decision discussed in a recent issue of the
REvIEW,'2 the Supreme Court completes the design commenced in income
tax cases within the last two decades.8 After the Cohn case, most recent
in this series, it was apparent that logic would compel the Court to permit
multi-state taxation in this field. In the Cohn case, however, only one
state had taxed, so the double taxation problem was not in fact before the
Court. In the instant case two states had imposed an income tax on the
same proceeds. 4 Hence, in sustaining this levy, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned multi-state income taxation, thereby not only fulfilling the predictions made after the decision in the Cohn case,' but also showing conclusively that the fact of multi-state taxation is not controlling. 6 With
a single sentence a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. justice McReynolds, distinguished that line of cases which had invalidated on jurisdictional grounds other forms of multi-state taxation.7 In view of this,
the instant decision taken with Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania'
leads to interesting speculation as to the future position of the Court on
the question of multi-state taxation and the due process clause.'
Taxation-Taxability of Stock Dividend of Preferred Shares
Where Only Common Shares Were Outstanding-In 1927 a corporation, having authorized heretofore only common shares, amended its articles to include non-voting, cumulative, preferred shares and issued them
proportionately to holders of the common stock as a dividend. In 1934
and 1935 the dividend shares were surrendered to the company for cancellation and retirement. The Commissioner taxed the whole amount of
the proceeds of the redemption, treating the stock dividend as income and
the basis for determining gain or loss upon its disposal as zero. Held,
that the stock dividend was income, the preferred shares having given the
common stockholder additional and different interests than he formerly
possessed by virtue of his ownership of merely common shares, and,
I. The question of equal protection involved an interpretation of Virginia statutes.
The Supreme Court held that the Virginia court had not so interpreted them as to deny
equal protection. Instant case at 34.
2. See (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 555.
3. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (i919); Maguire v. Treffry, 253 U. S. 12
(1920); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932) ; New York ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (i937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 645.
4. Instant case at 34.

5. (i937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 759, 761.
6. In Maguire v. Treffry, 253 U. S. 12 (i92o), the Supreme Court held that income of a resident beneficiary from a trust administered outside the state could be taxed
by the domiciliary state. In this case the state of trust administration had not taxed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion.
7. Instant case at 34, n. I.
8. 302 U. S. 5o6 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 556.
9. Cf. Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term (0938) 86 U. OF
PA. L. Rxv. 1, 26.
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1
therefore, the basis for tax measurement was zero. Frank J. and Hubert

Kelly Trust et al., 38 B. T. A., Oct. 25, 1938.

This decision answers the quare raised in a recent issue of the

REVIEW 2 as to whether a preferred stock dividend on common shares,

where no other preferred shares were outstanding, constitutes a sufficiently
"different interest" 3 to the shareholders to be constitutionally taxable as
income. The point that rendered the result in this case speculative was
the fact that since all outstanding shares received the same dividend no
proportionate change was effected thereby in any stockholder's interest
had definitely
in the corporation. 4 Previously, the Board of Tax Appeals
5
accepted, on the authority of Koshland v. Helvering, the view that such a
proportionate change in the stockholder's interest was the6 sole and necesNevertheless,
sary factor for the stock dividend to constitute income.
and declare
opinion
its
reverse
to
constrained
felt
have
may
the Board
the present dividend taxable as income because of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Helvering v. Gowran5 There a dividend of preferred shares
to common shareholders was made, and although preferred shares were
outstanding, this fact was not commented on and apparently not considered by Justice Brandeis in holding such a dividend was income." Possibly relying on this later opinion, the Board widened the "different interest" test to include not only a different proportional interest, but also any
additional or different qualitative interests conferred on the stockholder
dividend. The adoption of this test
by reason of the receipt of the stock
9
of the origachieves a result thought desirable by those who disapproved
0
Macomber.1
v.
Eisner
by
down
laid
inal restrictions
i. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1938). The taxpayer, on the ground that
the dividend was not income, apparently had returned a lesser amount derived by allocating the cost of the original common shares over both the preferred dividend shares
subtract
and the common shares, using that as his cost basis for the preferred shares to Presumfrom the proceeds of the redemption thus giving him a lower taxable amount.
ably this was done on the authority of United States Treasury Regulations issued under
the Revenue Act of 1934, U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22 (a)-8, 113 (a)-(i2)-I. These
are similar to the Treasury Regulations issued under the Revenue Act of 1938, U. S.
Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 58, 6oo, which were held not applicable to dividends constituting
income in Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 446 (1936), which ruling was followed
in Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 244 n. 2 (1938).
2. (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 441, 443.
3. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 446 (1936).
4. In this feature it resembles a dividend of common stock to common shareholders,
no preferred outstanding, which is the situation presented in Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U. S. I89 (1920), the original "stock dividend" case.
5. 298 U. S. 441 (1936). See: Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, X937
Term, Part II (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 165, 176; Note (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 83, IOI; (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rxv.441, 442; (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 702, 704.
6. August Horrmann, 34 B. T. A. 1178 (1936). Similar decisions of the Board were
previous to the Koshland case, which pointed out that no stock dividend was taxable
by statute. Any discussion in these decisions on the constitutional question the Board
now discounts as being mere dictum. See instant decision.
7. 302 U. S. 238 (1938).

8. Lowndes, loc. cit. supra note 5 (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 441, 443; (1938) 5I

HARv. L. RV. 702, 706.

9. Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision (1921) 21
COL. L. REy. 313, 331: "A direct reversal (of the Eisner case) is not probable; the
most that can be hoped for is that this decision construing the Sixteenth Amendment
will be followed by countless others limiting and modifying the decision step by step."
Considering the end to be achieved, the rule is not un10. 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
meritorious. The lower court's dissent in Commissioner v. Koshland considered the
addition of voting rights was a "different interest". 81 F. (2d) 641, 644, 645 (C. C. A.

9th, 1936). The opinion was also expressed that the meaning to be derived from the
"stock reorganization" cases is that a receipt of a different kind of stock with addi-
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Trade Regulation-Issuing Trading Stamps with Retail Sales
Not a Violation of Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act-Plaintiff, producer
of trade-marked drug articles, seeks to enjoin defendant from giving trading stamps with each purchase of plaintiff's goods, the resale price of which
is established by contracts permitted by the act.' Held, injunction denied
because this practice is not price cutting within the meaning of the act and
even if it were, the producer cannot get the relief sought because it has
shown no substantial injury. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Brothers, Inc., 33
Pa. D. & C. 52 (C. P. 1938).
The problem of whether a gift of trading stamps with retail purchases constitutes price cutting and thus violates the Fair Trade Acts
apparently had not been decided before this case. Also, there is a lack
of authority by analogy because prior to 1934 contracts for resale price
maintenance were held to be violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust law.'
However, much recent legislation has, unlike the Pennsylvania enactment,
dealt specifically with this point. Rule 17 of the Petroleum Industry
Code, 3 drawn up under the N. R. A., 4 specifically forbade retailers to give
trading stamps with the sale of petroleum products because it tended to
cause price cutting wars. 5 Nevertheless, two District Courts refused to
issue restraining orders against this practice where the effect on interstate
commerce of giving premiums with sales of gasoline appeared too remote. 6
It may be inferred that the same practice is considered price cutting by
the Robinson-Patman Act 7 which provides that to offer free services with
sales to some and not all customers is price discrimination, but no cases
have arisen thereunder on this point. The Fair Trade Acts of seventeen
states now have specific provisions against the practice." But, bound by
no authority, the instant court has concluded that since the defendant
issued trading stamps in good faith 9 and not in an attempt to evade the
act, it was merely a form of advertising not within the general purpose of
the act to prevent predatory price cutting or loss leader sales.10 Although
there is considerable collateral authority for the statement that this practional or changed incidents confers a "different interest" sufficient to render that stock
dividend income. Id. at 648, 649. Although both of these conclusions have been disputed, the rule does not seem to contain any intrinsic fallacies. See: I PAUL AND
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (Supp. 1937) § 8.84, n. 55i-2, 55i-5.

I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 73, § 7 et seq.; see McLaughlin, Fair
Trade Acts (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 803.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (890),
15 U. S. C. A. § I et seq. (1927) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (ig1). The Miller-Tydings Amendment, 5o STAT. 693
(1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § I (Supp. 1938), contains provisions substantially similar to
the state Fair Trade Acts.
3. 1O4 C. C. H. Fed. Trade Reg. Serv. (7th ed.) 1f8758, invalidated by Panama

Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
4. 48 STAT. 195 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 70 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
5. See United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547, 551 (D. Md. 1934).

6. United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., 5 F. Supp. 798 (N. D. Ill.

1934) ; United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1934) ; cf. United States v. Rose

Oil Co., 1O4 C. C. H. Fed. Trade Reg. Serv. (7th ed.) (Ct. Decisions Supp.) ff7182
(S. D. Miss. 1934) (wherein a temporary injunction was granted on same facts);
Victor v. Ickes, 104 C. C. H. Fed. Trade Reg. Serv. (7th ed.) (Ct. Decisions Supp.)
If7o8o (D. C. Sup. Ct. 1933) (wherein plaintiff was denied an injunction against pro-

posed enforcement of the code).

7. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (d) (e) (Supp. 1938).
8. McLaughlin, supra note I, at 816; instant case at 70.

9. Johnson & Johnson v. Webster Cut Rate Drug Stores, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 15, 1937,
p. 2184, col. 2 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) (preliminary injunction denied partly because defendant alleged it acted in good faith in cutting prices).
IO. McLaughlin, supra note I, at 813.
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tice is a kind of advertising,11 it should be noted that loss leader selling
is also a type of advertising. The general tenor of the opinion, however,
is that the court is willing to distinguish between good and bad price cutting. Although this might be justified as an interpretation of the general
it should be noted that no such distinction is
policy of the legislature,
12
mentioned in the act.
The court's conclusion that, even if defendant's acts were violations of
the act, plaintiff could not have an injunction because it had shown no
substantial injury, would seem to be contrary to existing authority. The
United States Supreme Court, in declaring the Illinois Fair Trade Act
constitutional, said that the interest to be protected is the good will of the
owner of the trade-mark; 13 and the New Jersey Chancery Court even went
so far as to intimate that only the owner of the trade-mark could sue.14
Since it would be almost impossible to prove actual damage to such a
vague interest, the natural inference from these authorities is that actual
damage need not be shown. This proposition is directly supported by a
recent holding of the New York supreme court.' 5 Thus the contrary
ruling of the instant court greatly hinders the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania Act.
Trade Regulation-State Law Fixing Prices in Cleaning and Dyeing Industry Upheld-A Florida statute designed to regulate the
cleaning and dyeing industry was enacted in 1937.1 The section authorizing price fixing by a Board was attacked. 2 Held, that the act is constitutional as a reasonable regulation necessitated by chaotic economic conditions in the industry. Miami Laundry Co. v. FloridaDry Cleaning and
Laundry Board, 183 So. 759 (Sup. Ct. Fla., 1938).
This case is significant in that the court adopts a more honest and
realistic test to determine the validity of legislative regulation of trades
which cannot be classified as "paramount" industries. In spite of the
liberal language of recent decisions of the Supreme Court,8 other courts
have invalidated these statutes unless a reasonable relation to health and
morals was found. This latter reasoning has been criticized in recent issues
of the REviaw 4 on the ground that it ignores the possibility of an economic justification which, regardless of the wisdom of the particular statutes, should prevent it from being branded an arbitrary deprivation of
property and a denial of equal protection. It is noteworthy, therefore, that
the instant court indicated that such regulation should be upheld where
it is shown that "conditions in a business become such that the welfare
of the public will not adequately be protected by unrestricted competition,
or . . . that ruinous and chaotic conditions are otherwise about to be
brought about in the business, (and) that the economic existence of large
ii. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 24o U. S. 342 (i916) ; cases collected, United

States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547, 555, n. IV.
12. McLaughlin, supra note i,at 81g.
13. Old Dearborn Corp. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
14. Schenley Products Co. v. Franklin Stores, 122 N. J. Eq. 69,
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(I937).
i5.Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Stores, i66 Misc. 342, 2 N. Y.
S. (2d) 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938).

i.Fla. Laws 1937, c. 17894.

2. Id. at § 6.

3. Nebbia v. New

U. S. 379 (937).

4. (1938) 87 U.

York, 291

U. S.502 (1934) ; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300

OF PA. L. REv. 128.
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numbers of people is being threatened . . . ".- Although it is not clear
whether the court is completely overthrowing the old tests or merely enlarging their scope," it is evident that the economic considerations are now
admitted by the Florida court to be the decisive factor.

Wills-Right of Testator to Direct Disposal of Body After Death
-Accompanying a duly executed will and codicil, in a petition for probate, was a separate instrument containing only the purported bequest of
testatrix's body for the purpose of medical research. Held, that the instrument was testamentary in character and hence entitled to probate as a
means of giving effect to testatrix's wishes. In re Johnson's Estate, 7
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 81 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
The instant court adopts the general rule that an instrument which
neither disposes of property nor provides for the appointment of an executor is not testamentary in character and hence is not entitled to probate.' Therefore, in order to reach the above result, the court was required
to conclude that there can be property in a dead body, at least for the
purpose of probate. The available authorities apparently support this conclusion, 2 but the issue was not so clearly defined in them as in the instant
case.3 The rights of the next of kin to the custody, control, and disposal4
of the body seem to have been almost invariably recognized and protected,
and, while the cases 5 involving these rights do dispute the old common law
rule that there is no property in a corpse," the courts in those cases were
not called on to decide the question directly. The recognition of such
rights, proprietary in nature, has provided a basis for criticizing the existence of the old common law rule,7 but, inasmuch as these are legal inter5. Instant case at 763.

Cf. Montana v. Safeway Stores, Inc., i Lab. Rel. Rep. 703

(Mont. 1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 9o6.
6. See instant case at 763.
i. Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S. E. 672 (1888) ; i PAGE, WiLLs (2d ed.
1926) §§ 38, 39, 527; THomPsoN, WILLS (2d ed. 1936) § 189.
2. See infra notes 4, 9 and IO; THomPsoN, WILLs (2d ed. 1936) § 561.
Contra:
Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1882). See Note (1882) 17 L. J. 149.
3. But see Pierce v. Proprietors, io R. I. 227, 232 (1872).
4. Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48 (1914) ; Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 167 N. C. 55, 83 S. E. 12 (1914) ; England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W.
Va. 575, 104 S. E. 46 (1920). But cf. Griffith v. Charlotte, C. & A. Ry., 23 S. C. 25
(1885). Many courts, in ruling on the rights of next of kin in the dead body, make the
qualification "in the absence of testamentary disposition", indicating that effect will be
given to testator's directions respecting his body when occasion arises: People v. Harvey, 286 Ili. 593, 6ol, 122 N. E. 138, 141 (1919); Painter v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co.,
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Md. 301, 308, 91 Atl. 158, 16o (1914); Hasselbach v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 173
159 N. Y. Supp. 376, 378 (1916). See Note (188o) 10 CENTRAL L. J.

App. Div. 89, 9I,
303.

5. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 5o N. W. 238 (1891); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
AtI. 878 (1904).

207 Pa. 313, 56

6. This rule is apparently traced to a dictum of Lord Coke: "It is to be observed
that in every sepulcher that hath a monument, two things are to be considered, viz. the
monument, and the sepulture or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver (that
is caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance, but
as to the monument, action is given (as hath been said) at the common law for defacing thereof." 3 Coke, Institutes (1817) 203. For criticism see In re Widening of Beekman Street, 4 Bradf. 503, 52o et seq. (N. Y. 1857).

7. See cases cited supra note 5; Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead
(9o5) 17 THE GREEN BAG 345, 346; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 404.
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ests which the courts will protect regardless of questions of property," this
criticism is not conclusive. Other cases have given effect to the wishes of
deceased regarding the disposal of his body, expressed either orally during
his lifetime 9 or in an otherwise valid will which had been previously probated. 10 Again, the indication that these courts were merely observing
their duty 11 to carry out the expressed wishes of the testator whenever
possible and not contravening public policy suggests that a determination
of the property question was not required. The instant court attempts to
rationalize its position by considering that the common law rule was
advanced at a time when belief in the resurrection of the body was paramount, making it unthinkable that such a sacred object could be property.12 From this thought it might follow that, fundamentally, the common
law, while saying that the body is not property in the ordinary commercial
sense, did not deny that there could be proprietary interests therein for
other purposes. Whether this view be accepted or not, at least the ultimate
result reached by the instant court is in harmony with the available authorities, and there is apparently no practical reason why the attainment of
such result should be prevented by a strict application of the rules of
probate. It seems that consideration of the property question causes unnecessary confusion, and that the solution lies in taking a more realistic
view of the purpose of probate and treating the expressed wish of the
testator as an act of testamentation 13 although not involving property
at all.
8. See Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48, 53 (1914) ; Pound, Interests of Personality (i915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 355 et seq. Both Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch.
D. 659 (1882) and Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170 (igoo) recognize the
rights of custody and control in the next of kin, although denying the right of testamentary disposition of the body since there is no property therein. See Notes (1933)
CORN. L. Q. io8, (1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 204.
9. Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 6r N. W. 842 (1895) ; Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila.
io6 (Pa. 1883) ; see Yome v. Gorman, 242 N. Y. 395, 402, 152 N. E. 126, 128 (z926).
IO. In re Henderson's Estate, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 449, 57 P. (2d) 212 (1936) (distinguishing Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170 [19oo]) ; Cooney v. English, 86
Misc. 292, 148 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1914) ; see It re Dixon, [1892] P. 386, 391.
ii. See Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 23r, 6I N. W. 842, 843 (I895).
12. Instant case at 84.
13. The instant court, citing 4 Sco-rT, TnE CiviL LAW (1932) go, points out that

the Roman law, on which much of our probate law is based, considered the directions
of deceased respecting his body, as a valid act of testamentation.

